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From the report报告摘录Persistent Oil Shock Risk: Iran-linked oil price persistence (vs. one-off shocks) fundamentally alters central bank policy calculus, demanding proactive intervention beyond neutral stance.

Inside the report报告内文 Verbatim from the original PDF — first pages原版 PDF 开篇原文 · 逐字摘录

18 September 2026, 12:07 UTC Chief Investment Office GWM Investment Research

What happens if Iran is setting global rates? Blog Paul Donovan, Chief Economist, UBS GWM, UBS AG London Branch

Recent central bank commentary has cited oil prices as a reason to consider tightening policy. Traditional oil price shocks are something central banks look past as “one-off” price events. Unfortunately, there have been a lot of one- off events in quick succession of late; at some point, a chain of one-off events looks continuous to a non-economist.

Normally, an oil price rise means people have less money to spend in the non- oil economy. That demand drop creates price disinflation, partially offsetting the relative oil price increase. This time, consumers have chosen to cut savings rather than non-oil consumption. Demand declines have been avoided.

Central bank policy to date has been more gesture than economic substance. Interest rates are just within the range of neutral policy. But if oil prices are exerting more influence, a more damaging monetary policy becomes possible.

Ultimately, the only way central banks can control a relative price increase in one part of the economy (oil) is to create relative price declines elsewhere in the economy. That implies that if oil prices keep rising, and central banks are no longer prepared to look past them, there will be an attempt to run a restrictive monetary policy and engineer a slowdown or mild recession in the non-oil economy.

This report has been prepared by UBS AG London Branch. Please see important disclaimers and disclosures at the end of the document.

Global asset class preferences definitions The asset class preferences provide high-level guidance to make investment decisions. The preferences reflect the collective judgement of the members of the House View meeting, primarily based on assessments of expected total returns on liquid and commonly known indices, House View scenarios, and analyst convictions over the next 12 months. Absolute view Attractive: We consider this asset class to be attractive. Consider opportunities in this asset class. Neutral: We do not expect outsized returns or losses. Hold longer-term exposure. Unattractive: We consider this asset class to be unattractive. Consider alternative opportunities. Note: For equities, we have a five-tier rating system with two additional preferences. When equities are included with the other asset classes in the three-tier rating system, we collapse “Most Attractive” with “Attractive” and “Least Attractive” with “Unattractive.” Most Attractive: We consider this asset class to be among the most attractive. Investors should seek opportunities to add exposure. Least Attractive: We consider this asset class to be among the least attractive. Seek more favorable alternatives opportunities. Relative preferences For the multi asset view, we also include relative preferences to help investors compare between items. Preferred: We view this item more favorably than others within its asset class.* Neutral: We see this item similarly to others within its asset class.* Least preferred: We view this item less favorably than others within its asset class.* *In the case of cross-asset, compared to other asset classes. Note: The tactical asset allocation (TAA) positioning of our different investment strategies may differ from these views due to factors including portfolio construction, concentration, and borrowing constraints.

Appendix Risk information UBS Chief Investment Office's ("CIO") investment views are prepared and published by the Global Wealth Management business of UBS Switzerland AG (regulated by FINMA in Switzerland) or its affiliates ("UBS"), part of UBS Group AG ("UBS Group"). UBS Group includes former Credit Suisse AG, its subsidiaries, branches and affiliates. The investment views have been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. Generic investment research – Risk information: This publication is for your information only and is not intended as an offer, or a solicitation of an offer, to buy or sell any investment or other specific product. The analysis contained herein…

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